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Key points
•	 More	than	two	and	a	half	years	after	Russia	annexed	Crimea	
(in	March	2014),	Moscow	considers	 the	 case	 closed;	 it	 treats	
the	 peninsula	 as	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	
and	has	ruled	out	any	talks	on	its	status.	For	Kyiv	meanwhile,	
in	contrast	to	its	declarations,	regaining	control	of	the	penin-
sula	does	not	seem	to	be	a	priority	–	as	of	now,	despite	its	an-
nouncements,	 the	Ukrainian	government	has	not	developed	
a	strategy	to	recover	Crimea,	and	its	only	de facto	activity	in	
this	regard	has	been	to	rely	on	a	limited	blockade	of	the	pen-
insula.	These	activities	are	supported	by	the	Crimean	Tatars,	
who	are	maintaining	their	own	blockade	of	the	access	roads	
to	Crimea.	The	Crimean	Tatars	and	their	representative	body,	
the	Mejlis,	are	now	the	only	force	in	Ukraine	who	have	a	genu-
ine,	and	not	merely	feigned,	interest	in	altering	the	Crimean	
status quo.
•	 Since	 the	 annexation,	 relatively	 few	 people	 have	 decided	 to	
leave	 the	 peninsula.	 These	 have	 mostly	 been	 Crimean	 Ta-
tars	 (individual	 Tatar	 leaders	 have	 been	 forbidden	 to	 reside	
in	Crimea	by	 the	Russian	authorities).	The	predominant	ap-
proach	 among	 Crimea’s	 inhabitants,	 regardless	 of	 whatever	
views	they	may	have	expressed,	has	been	to	adapt	to	the	new	
conditions.	Within	a	few	months	of	the	annexation,	the	vast	
majority	of	the	inhabitants	had	adopted	Russian	citizenship.	
At	the	same	time,	some	of	them	have	retained	their	Ukrainian	
passports,	to	make	travel	abroad	possible.
•	 The	standard	of	living	since	the	annexation	has	not	improved.	
The	only	raises	have	gone	to	bureaucrats,	some	state	employ-
ees,	and	military	&	law	enforcement	officials	(siloviki),	while	
the	income	of	certain	professional	groups	has	even	fallen,	es-
pecially	 those	 related	 to	 tourism.	As	well	 as	 the	drop	 in	 the	
number	of	tourists,	this	state	of	affairs	has	been	caused	by	the	
crisis	in	Russia,	sanctions,	and	the	isolation	of	the	peninsula;	
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this	makes	it	harder	to	import	all	kinds	of	products	and	goods,	
which	in	turn	affects	their	prices.	Compared	with	the	period	
before	the	annexation,	supplies	of	water,	and	to	some	degree	
electricity,	have	worsened;	it	has	also	become	more	difficult	to	
access	banking	services.
•	 Regardless	of	the	complex	of	social,	transport	and	communi-
cation	problems,	the	vast	majority	of	the	Crimean	people	are	
satisfied	with	the	annexation,	and	consider	the	economic	dif-
ficulties	to	be	temporary.	This	is	due	to	the	traditionally	pro-
Russian	sympathies	of	Crimea’s	residents	(two-thirds	of	whom	
are	ethnic	Russians),	reinforced	thanks	to	Russian	propagan-
da	which	has	presented	the	annexation	as	the	restoration	of	
historical	justice	and	protecting	the	peninsula	from	war	and	
chaos.	 The	 domination	 of	 the	 Russian	media	will	 foster	 the	
further	 integration	of	 the	peninsula	with	Russia.	Even	now,	
the	 degree	 of	 integration	 in	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 spheres	
should	be	assessed	as	greater	than	the	level	of	Crimea’s	inte-
gration	into	Ukraine	was	in	the	years	before	the	annexation.
•	 The	group	most	affected	as	a	result	of	the	annexation	was	the	
Crimean	Tatars;	 they	have	been	 the	predominant	victims	of	
human	rights	violations,	are	frequently	stopped	by	the	police	
and	the	FSB,	and	are	the	group	most	commonly	targeted	for	
kidnappings.	 The	 Crimean	 Tatars’	Mejlis	 has	 been	 declared	
an	extremist	organisation	in	Russia,	and	several	of	its	leaders	
have	 been	 banned	 from	 entering	Crimea;	 also,	 the	 Crimean	
Tatar	 television	station	ATR’s	 licence	has	not	been	renewed.	
At	the	same	time,	however,	it	is	difficult	to	say	that	mass	per-
secution	of	the	Crimean	Tatars	is	underway.
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i. so Crimea isn’t yours, but is it really ours? 
From the point of view of Moscow – and several other capitals1 – 
the ‘Republic of Crimea’ and the separate city of Sevastopol have, 
since 21 March 2014, been two entities (regions) of the Russian 
Federation: on that day President Vladimir Putin signed a law 
admitting both units into Russia. Initially, they joined the newly 
appointed, separate Crimean Federal District, with its capital in 
Simferopol; however, on 28 July 2016 the district was abolished, 
and by presidential decree Crimea and Sevastopol were included 
into the Southern Federal District. This seems to have been a dem-
onstration that the annexed areas are just as much ‘Russia’ as the 
other entities of the Federation – the Kremlin has consistently re-
jected any talks on the future of Crimea, deeming the act of an-
nexation as irreversible and not open to debate – and was intend-
ed to aid their accelerated integration with the rest of the country.
In accordance with the principles of international law, both the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (the official Ukrainian name of 
this area), and Sevastopol (the separate city) are parts of Ukraine 
currently under Russian occupation. In addition to Kyiv, this 
opinion is shared by the vast majority of states and international 
organisations (including the EU). Given Russia’s effective control 
of Crimea (Kyiv deems 20 February 2014 as marking the begin-
ning of the occupation), in April 2014 the Ukrainian parliament 
adopted a law on the protection of the citizens’ rights and free-
doms, and on the legal system in the temporarily occupied territo-
ry of Ukraine, which inter alia regulated the issues of the activities 
of the Crimean authorities (Kherson was named their temporary 
headquarters), as well as confirming that residents of Crimea 
retain Ukrainian citizenship (the Russian replacement of docu-
ments was not acknowledged). The State Service for Crimea and 
1 The annexation of Crimea by Russia has been recognised by Afghanistan, 
Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela. It is worth noting that 
Nicaragua and Venezuela have also recognised the independence of Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia.
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Sevastopol was created by the Ukrainian Government, although 
in April 2016 this was merged with the agency dealing with the 
occupied parts of the Donbas (at that time, the Ministry for Tem-
porarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons 
was created).
Regardless of these numerous declarations, however, the return 
of Crimea does not seem to be a priority for the Ukrainian govern-
ment. This may be demonstrated by its failure to prepare its long-
expected strategy in this area, with tasks assigned to the differ-
ent agencies and institutions of the state2 – to which the Crimean 
Tatar activists have drawn particular attention3. The cause of this 
state of affairs seems above all to be the realisation that the resto-
ration of the country’s territorial integrity is unlikely in the fore-
seeable future (which, in the light of the need for urgent domestic 
reforms, means that this has to be postponed); and further down 
the road, the ruling elite’s fear that hypothetical participation in 
further Ukrainian elections by Crimea (and the Donbas) could 
significantly worsen their own parties’ results4.
After the annexation, a part of the population decided to leave 
the peninsula. The greatest exodus took place during the first few 
months (before the end of 2014). Fully accurate figures are not avail-
able – not everyone has formally re-registered, some people left and 
then returned – but estimates vary most often from about fifteen to 
more than twenty thousand people, or about 1 per cent of the total 
2 Elements of reintegration strategy have been discussed in the Ukrainian 
parliament, but on 7 September 2016 it failed to accept a series of recom-
mendations on this matter which had already been drawn up (in the form of 
a parliamentary resolution).
3 OSW (CES) interviews with Mejlis activists and representatives of the Crime-
an Tatar media. Ukraine, May 2016.
4 Both regions have traditionally voted for pro-Russian parties and candidates; 
for example, in the parliamentary elections on 28 October 2012, 52.34% of 
the vote in Crimea (excluding Sevastopol) went to the Party of Regions (30% 
across Ukraine as a whole), while Batkivshchyna won 13.09% (25.54%), and the 
nationalist Svoboda party 1.04% (10.44%).
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population of Crimea (excluding Sevastopol)5. According to data 
from Krymstat (the Crimean statistical office, an organ of the Rus-
sian Federal Statistical Service), between 1 January 2013 and 1 July 
2014 the population of Crimea (excluding Sevastopol) fell from 
1,957,463 to 1,884,473, that is, by close to 73,000 people6, but on 1 Jan-
uary 2016 the figure stood at 1,907,106, which is thus an increase.
The changes in the population of Crimea (including Sevastopol) in 
the years 1989-2016 proceeded as follows7:
  1989 (a) 2001 (b) 2014 (c) 2016 (d)
total 2,430,495 2,401,209 2,284,769 2,323,369	
russians 1,629,542	
(67.05%)
1,450,394	
(60.40%)
1,492,078	
(67.90%) 	no	data
ukrainians 625,919	
(25.75%)
576,647	
(24.01%)
344,515	
(15.68%) 	no	data
Crimean 
tatars
38,365	
(1.58%)
245,291	
(10.22%)
232,340	
(10.57%) 	no	data
5 Crimean Tatar sources usually report slightly higher estimates; for example. 
Mustafa Jemilev believes that by summer 2016, about 50,000 people had left, 
half of whom were Crimean Tatars (Polowanie na Tatara. Z przywódcą Ta-
tarów Krymskich Mustafą Dżemilewem rozmawia Wacław Radziwinowicz. 
[Hunting Tatar. The leader of the Crimean Tatars Mustafa Jemilev talks with 
Waclaw Radziwinowicz], Gazeta Wyborcza, 27–28 August 2016). Other Mejlis 
activists estimate that about 35,000 people decided to leave (about 50% of the 
migrants are also assumed to be Crimean Tatars in this case).
6 http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/3f51f
e8047d4c435a335a7ed3bc4492f/%D0%9D%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BB
%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5.pdf
7 Author’s calculations on the basis of the following data: the Census of the 
Soviet Union from 1989 (a); the Ukrainian census of 2001 (b); the Russian cen-
sus in the then Crimean Federal District of 14-25 October 2014; that census 
included 87,205 people, or 3.82% of the total population, who did not report 
their nationalities; therefore the percentages of Russians, Ukrainians and 
Crimean Tatars were calculated in relation to those people who did report 
their nationality, and not in relation to the total population of Crimea includ-
ing Sevastopol (c), as well as data from Rosstat for 1 January 2016 (d).
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Probably at least half of those who have left are Crimean Tatars 
(about 7500-15,000, which is 3-6% of their entire population in 
Crimea); these probably included members and sympathisers of 
the Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in Russia but 
legal in Ukraine (according to data from the Russian Interior Min-
istry, the number of such sympathisers in Crimea fell in the first 
year since annexation from 10,000 to 25008; the departure of per-
sons associated with this party has also been confirmed by Crime-
an Tatar sources9). In addition to the Tatars, Crimea has also seen 
the departure of people loyal to the Ukrainian state, including ac-
tivists of the local Maidans, officers of the army and law enforce-
ment agencies who remained loyal to Kyiv, and small traders who 
feared for the future of their companies. Most emigrants from 
Crimea have moved on to ‘continental’ (or ‘mainland’) Ukraine10, 
and a number have gone to EU countries. At the same time, a simi-
lar number of citizens of the Russian Federation (around 20,000) 
have moved to the peninsula, including Sevastopol; these people 
have mainly been assigned work in the organs of administration 
and the institutions of force11.
Those who have remained – that is, the vast majority of the resi-
dents – have over time adapted to the requirements of the new 
authorities, regardless of their attitude to the annexation. Ac-
cording to estimates by the Mejlis, by the autumn of 2014 20-30% 
8 https://ria.ru/incidents/20150330/1055412640.html; it was not stated how 
many of these people had left Crimea, and how many had stayed, but left 
the party.
9 http://courier.crimea.ua/news/courier/ludi/1154303.html
10 This word is commonly used in Crimea (and often also in Ukrainian journal-
ism) to refer to the remaining part of Ukraine, reflecting the sense of isola-
tion of the peninsula’s inhabitants.
11 The report «Крым без правил. Перемещение Российской Федерации 
населения гражданского на оккупированную территорию Украины» 
[Crimea beyond rules: displacement of Russian civilian population to the 
occupied territory of Ukraine] (2015), prepared by a coalition of Ukrainian 
human rights organisations, lists the names of over 120 people who upon 
their arrival on the peninsula took positions in the governments of Crimea 
and Sevastopol, as well as in the judicial and prosecutorial authorities.
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of Crimean Tatars and about 80% of representatives of other na-
tionalities had taken Russian passports (citizenship). At that time 
(autumn 2014) the authorities ran a publicity campaign which 
sowed the fear that after the end of the ‘transitional period’ (that 
is, from 1 January 2015; the full economic and legal integration of 
Crimea into the Russian Federation was to have been completed 
by that date), residents who did not possess Russian documents 
could lose their jobs or their businesses; students were threatened 
with refusal to issue their graduation certificates. Then, the dead-
line to resolve this issue was moved to April 201512. It should be 
assumed that there are now only a few individuals in Crimea who 
do not have Russian citizenship13, as a Russian identity card is re-
quired for dealing with all bureaucratic matters, to visit a doctor 
at a state clinic, etc.
One part of the strategy to adapt to the new conditions was the 
approach to replacing number plates on cars and other means 
of transport. The Russian authorities do not accept cars bearing 
Ukrainian-issued Crimean number plates14, and cars with Rus-
sian-issued Crimean numbers are not allowed into Ukraine. Resi-
dents of Crimea who frequently travel between Crimea and the 
12 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
13 According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, as of 21 April 2014, i.e. 
within the one-month deadline for making such a declaration, 3427 Crimean 
inhabitants were formally refused Russian citizenship (http://rian.com.ua/
CIS_news/20140422/345528247.html; failure to file a special application 
led to automatic recognition of the given person as a citizen of the Russian 
Federation, but this person had to act individually to acquire the relevant 
documents). It is hard to say how many people in this group left Crimea and 
how many remained on the peninsula. It must be assumed that the majority 
of migrants who have moved to ‘continental’ Ukraine did not submit formal 
documents to refuse citizenship of the Russian Federation.
14 The owners of the vehicles had time to exchange their number plates until 
1 April 2016. From that date until the beginning of September, 3300 driv-
ers were fined for driving vehicles bearing Ukrainian numbers issued in 
Crimea, to a total sum of 1.97 million roubles (the average size of the fine was 
thus around 600 roubles, or about US$10), and 209 drivers had their driv-
ing licences temporarily confiscated (the law states that the punishment for 
a repeat offence is confiscation of the driver’s licence for a period of one to 
three months); http://ru.krymr.com/a/27963967.html
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‘mainland’ (there is no data on their numbers) have re-registered 
their vehicles with families or friends resident in Kherson, Kyiv 
or elsewhere, and drive them around the peninsula and the rest of 
Ukraine on the basis of a notarised certified authorisation.
Despite having adopted Russian citizenship, some Crimean resi-
dents have retained Ukrainian documents, usually without in-
forming the new authorities of this fact (as of 1 January 2016, 
hiding the possession of dual citizenship risks criminal liabil-
ity). The scale of the phenomenon is impossible to estimate, but it 
must be assumed that any Crimean who regularly travels outside 
the CIS has a Ukrainian passport; in March 2014, the consulates 
of EU states in Russia received a recommendation to cease issu-
ing visas to residents of Crimea. Moreover, it is now virtually 
impossible for residents of Crimea to obtain Schengen visas with 
a Russian passport at consulates in Ukraine (according to media 
reports, in the initial period some residents of Crimea received 
Russian documents registered in the Siberian and Far Eastern 
regions of the Russian Federation). A Ukrainian identity card 
is also needed to enter the ‘continent’ (exit from Crimea takes 
place on the basis of a Russian document, and entrance into the 
area controlled by the Ukrainian authorities requires a Ukrain-
ian document; sometimes, Ukrainian officials destroy or confis-
cate the Russian identity cards with Crimean registration which 
they find)15.
Obtaining a new Ukrainian identity card requires travel to the 
‘mainland’ and a wait of about two weeks, which takes time 
and money (residents of Crimea can report to any office in the 
15 The infrastructure of the Ukrainian checkpoints on the roads leading to 
Crimea recalls that of border crossings (border guards, customs, pavilions 
of veterinary and phytosanitary control customs, etc.), which is further evi-
dence that the authorities in Kyiv have – at least for the moment – de facto 
come to terms with the loss of the peninsula (no such infrastructure is to be 
found on the ‘border’ with the part of the Donbas controlled by pro-Russian 
separatists).
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country)16. Other documents – birth certificates, marriage, death 
– can in certain cases be handled by an intermediary, for exam-
ple by giving authority to a lawyer from a non-governmental or-
ganisation supporting Crimean residents (the Krym SOS organisa-
tion has the widest reach: http://www.krymsos.com/), although 
a great deal of determination is still necessary to fulfil all the re-
quirements and procedures. Because of these difficulties, as well 
as recurring cases of ill-treatment towards residents of Crimea 
in Ukrainian offices (calling them traitors, demanding bribes) it 
seems justified to claim that over time – especially after the road 
and rail bridge over the Strait of Kerch is opened, which is planned 
for 2018-19, and the peninsula’s physical isolation is reduced – in-
terest in Ukrainian papers will dwindle, and will be limited to the 
most determined individuals (Ukrainian patriots who for various 
reasons will not have decided to make the final move to the ‘conti-
nent’, as well as people who frequently travel abroad).
 
16 By April 2016 residents of Crimea had been issued with about 5000 Ukrainian 
identity cards. Maksim Koshelev, Украинские документы для крымчан 
[Ukrainian documents for residents of Crimea], Krymskoye Slovo, no. 2, 
26 April 2016. In Russia the identity card is issued from age 14, and in Ukraine 
from age 16.
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ii. there’s no dough, but hang on in there!
Residents of Crimea with pro-Russian attitudes – who are in the 
vast majority on the peninsula – supported the annexation not 
only for ideological motives, but also in the hope of a significant im-
provement in their living standards. Initially, in most cases sala-
ries and pensions actually increased significantly. It appears that 
the raises were a kind of ‘reward for loyalty’, and served as a propa-
ganda message that joining Russia pays off (according to rumours 
circulating in Crimea, the funding for these increases came from 
confiscated Ukrainian assets, primarily banks). However, after 
a few months – in some cases, right after the end of the ‘transitional 
period’ – the benefits were often reduced. Officially this has been 
attributed to the adjustment of the payment salaries in the public 
sphere to the Russian system, where salaries are influenced by age, 
seniority, grading etc. (in the period immediately after the annexa-
tion, the level of individual benefits was to have been determined 
on the basis of the respective average Russian salaries). However, 
these reductions, combined with inflation and a decline in the 
rate of the rouble, mean that now the financial situation on the 
peninsula is not significantly different from the present situation 
in Ukraine (which Russian propaganda presents as a state which 
is almost bankrupt and cannot meet its citizens’ basic needs).
The changes in the size of payments can be traced on the basis of 
the following examples:
 – Doctors: in the initial period after the annexation, they 
earned earn up to 20-40,000 roubles (about US$560-1120, at 
the exchange rate at that time), and now they can count on 
about 10-20,000 roubles (about US$150-300);
 – Teachers: likewise, initially 12-15,000 roubles (about US$340-420), 
and now about 8-10,000 roubles (about US$120-150);
 – Pensioners: the minimum pension was around 8000 roubles 
(about US$225); this is currently around 6000 roubles (a little 
over US$90);
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 – Unemployed people: the monthly benefit was around 
6000 roubles (nearly US$170), and currently stands at about 
850 roubles (about US$13), which is not even enough to pay the 
municipal charges17.
 
Crimean salaries compared to those in Russia and Ukraine
According to Rosstat (the Russian Federal Statistical Service), in 
2015 the average monthly salary in the then Crimean Federal 
District was 22,792 roubles (about US$340); in the ‘Republic of 
Crimea’ it was 22,464 roubles (about US$335), and in Sevastopol 
24,187 roubles (over US$360)18. Regardless of the fact that with-
in Russia these are not high earnings (the Russian average sal-
ary was 34,030 roubles, just under US$510), the examples given 
above show that in fact even skilled professionals in Crimea 
earn much less (the majority of the several thousand job offers 
available in 2015-2016 in the Crimean Employment Centre of-
fered salaries ranging from 5000 to 12,000 roubles, or about 
US$75-180). The figure for the average salary is raised by law 
enforcement officers (especially from the FSB), professional sol-
diers, employees of the judiciary and senior officials; salaries for 
these groups run at around 100,000 roubles (about US$1530), 
and are accordingly higher for top managers and directors19.
The average pension in the then Crimean Federal District as of 
1 January 2016 was 11,637.60 roubles (about US$175); in the ‘Re-
public of Crimea’ it was 11,460.50 roubles (over US$170), and in 
17 On 1 April 2014, the US dollar exchange rate was 35.6 roubles, but on 1 Sep-
tember 2016 it was 65.25 roubles. Data on wages comes from the OSW’s (CES’s) 
own estimates based on a range of media reports.
18 http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/
wages/. Data for 2014 is not available.
19 http://ru.krymr.com/a/27968518.html. The amounts relating to the year 2015 
were calculated on the basis of an exchange rate on 1 December 2015 of US$1 
= 66.74 roubles.
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Sevastopol 12,544.40 roubles (about $190). The Russian aver-
age was 12,080.90 roubles (just over US$180)20.
For comparison: in Ukraine, the average monthly salary in 
2015 was 4195 hryvnias (about US$175), and the average retir-
ee’s pension 1601 hryvnias (over US$65)21. This is significantly 
less (in dollar terms) than in annexed Crimea, although the 
purchasing power is comparable because Russian prices are 
generally higher than Ukrainian prices, and prices in Crimea, 
due to the isolation of the peninsula, are close to those in Mos-
cow (food, including dairy products and meat as well as veg-
etables and fruits, and clothing & building materials cost up 
to twice as much as in the neighbouring Krasnodar Krai). One 
commodity which has become cheaper since the annexation is 
used cars: one can now pay about US$2-3000 for a ten-year-old 
Western car in good condition in Crimea. Fuel (petrol, diesel, 
gas) is cheaper in Crimea than in Ukraine (by about 15-25%).
In opinion polls carried out as part of the Russian sociological 
Open Mind (Открытое мнение) project between April and June 
2016 on a representative sample of 1100 respondents from Rus-
sian-occupied Crimea and Sevastopol, the question ‘Which social 
problems in Crimea do you consider the most relevant for you 
and your family?’ received the following responses (respondents 
could select more than one problem):
 – increase in the prices of food products 83%
 – low salaries 63%
 – bad roads and problems with movement 63%
 – increases in municipal charges 61%
 – low level of medical services 59% 
 – low pensions 52%
20 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/urov_p1.htm
21 http://www.krisa.com.ua/srednyaya-zarplata-v-ukraine/, http://pensiaex-
pert.ru/calculator/srednyaya-pensiya-v-ukraine-po-itogam-2015-goda.html
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 – bad work and arbitrary behaviour by officials 51%
 – corruption 49%
 – low level of municipal services 45%
 – the threat of unemployment 37%
 – severance of ties with Ukraine 34%
 – high level of crime 31%
 – the arrival of large numbers of new residents to Crimea 24%
 – power cuts 22%
 – ethnic problems 21%
 – the reluctance of part of the population to be residents of Russia 17%
 – blockade of supplies from Ukraine 15%
 – difficulty in travelling abroad 13%22
A similar hierarchy of issues emerges from the research carried 
out at the end of June and the beginning of July 2016 by VTsIOM 
(the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre), although 
a slightly different methodology was used in the study; among oth-
er things, respondents could specify up to five problems (affect-
ing the respondent and his family), and only answers marked by 
a minimum of 3% of respondents were taken into account. There-
fore individual issues were highlighted by smaller percentages of 
respondents. The inhabitants of occupied Crimea and Seva stopol 
were questioned separately, and the representative samples num-
bered 1000 respondents:
 – bad roads, slow pace of their construction and repair 25% 
(in Sevastopol 30%)
 – high prices 23% (39%)
 – reduction in the number of jobs 13% (8%)
 – low salaries, lack of raises 12% (26%)
 – adverse changes to the health system 6% (7%)
 – high municipal tariffs 6% (7%)
22 http://www.openopinion.ru/content_res/articles/OO_Crimea_brief.pdf. 
Other problems were identified by 9% of respondents.
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 – poor level of land management 6% (9%)
 – reduction in the quality of medical services 6% (10%)23
A symbol of the Crimean people’s disappointment at their living 
conditions more than two years after the annexation (which does 
not, however, translate into dislike for the current status quo or 
any increase in pro-Ukrainian sentiments) is the exchange be-
tween the Prime Minister of Russia Dmitri Medvedev, who vis-
ited the peninsula in May 2016, and a group of residents. The older 
women complained that their pensions were not being index-
linked, to which the head of government said, “There is simply no 
money now. The money will be found – we’ll make the adjustment. 
You just hang on in there, [I wish you] all the best, good moods and 
good health.” The saying ‘There’s no dough, but hang on in there’ 
(in Russian Денег нет, но вы держитесь) has entered colloquial 
language as an illustration of a situation in which the state washes 
its hands of its obligations and leaves the citizens to fend for them-
selves. This quote has since been used in a song by the well-known 
Russian satirist Semyon Slepakov24.
23 https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115782. In this study, very few re-
spondents (only 2% and 4%) complained directly about corruption and bu-
reaucracy (but in addition, 4% and 3% of the respondents indicated ‘problems 
with registering the documents, queues, bureaucracy’).
24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8v2WIvEJ3c
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iii.  Corruption, lies, and the impunity 
of the bureauCrats
The problems identified by the respondents in the polls discussed 
above refer to different agendas. However, we can isolate two 
groups of problems from them: those that have been caused as 
a result of the direct actions or omissions of the Russian authori-
ties (both local and federal), or are related to the prevailing situ-
ation in Russia (the multidimensional crisis preventing raises in 
salaries and pensions), and those that are the result of the links 
with Ukraine being broken. Problems independent of the annexa-
tion, such as the poor quality of the roads (which is the result of 
many years of neglect), constitute a separate group, although over 
time these responsibilities will also begin to burden the current 
rulers of the peninsula.
The first group of problems may be deemed to include the cor-
ruption and arbitrary behaviour of administrators at multiple 
levels, as well as the overgrowth of the bureaucracy. As one online 
commenter cited on the website krymr.com (Krym.Realii, a pro-
ject of Radio Liberty) wrote, “corruption, lies and the impunity of 
the bureaucrats, their disrespectful attitude to the people, every 
kind of prohibition – these are the main signs of Russia coming 
here.”25 Meanwhile, according to Olga Skripnik, coordinator of 
the Crimean Human Rights Group, “the inhabitants of the pen-
insula have no way to defend their rights, which is related to the 
fact that Crimea remains a grey zone, where neither Russian nor 
international law applies.”26 
These problems have probably affected the owners of small and 
medium-sized companies to the greatest extent. Before the an-
nexation, small entrepreneurship was very well developed: in 
2013 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) at least 116,200 
25 http://ru.krymr.com/a/27937477.html
26 http://ru.krymr.com/a/news/27970104.html
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individual entrepreneur-individuals were operating, and the 
Ukrainian state register of individual entrepreneurs included 
57,365 companies in the ARC (including 54,527 legal entities, and 
2838 entities which did not have this status), as well as 16,203 in 
Sevastopol (15,598 and 605 respectively)27. Small and medium-
sized businesses in the ARC employed a third of all employees on 
the peninsula, and their share of Crimea’s income amounted to 
30% of its budget28.
After the annexation, many of these small entrepreneurs sus-
pended their activity: in January 2015, the number of individual 
entrepreneurs was only about 30,000 (including over 23,000 in 
the ‘Republic of Crimea’ and 7000 in Sevastopol), and the number 
of companies was over 21,000 (including more than 15,000 in the 
‘Republic of Crimea’ and 6000 in Sevastopol)29. This decline was 
caused by the following factors: (a) the lower number of visitors 
to Crimea (the tourist sector will be dealt with separately in lat-
er parts of this text); (b) so-called ‘Crimean’ economic sanctions 
imposed by the West; (c) the rupture of commercial and business 
ties with Ukraine; (d) logistical and legislative issues (Ukrainian 
legislation is more liberal to entrepreneurs than that of Russia); 
(e) the complicated accounting and reporting system required by 
the Russian tax authorities, and finally (f) the imposition of all 
sorts of ‘disciplinary’ penalties and fines on entrepreneurs.
Legal entities in Crimea were obliged to re-register (in accord-
ance with Russian legislation) by 1 March 2015, but not all of them 
were able to do so, often for formal reasons. Entities that were not 
27 Data from Ukrstat, the Ukrainian state statistical service, for 1 March 2014.
28 Антология современной крымской мифологии [Anthology of contempo-
rary Crimean mythology, ed. Pavel Kazarin & Olga Dukhnich, Kyiv 2016]. 
http://docs.rferl.org/ru-CRI/2016/02/23/eaf6be4b-16ae-443e-9a4d-67c1cef-
b15db.pdf
29 https://www.nalog.ru/rn77/news/activities_fts/5150597/. This analysis of 
the Ukrainian and Russian data is merely indicative, because the statistical 
systems of the two countries are different.
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registered (the deadline was not moved back because the ‘transi-
tional period’ was considered to have been completed) were de-
prived of the right to do business on the territory of the Russian 
Federation, and were subject to liquidation. By the beginning of 
September 2016, more than 2000 commercial, service and ca-
tering buildings had been pulled down as illegal on the basis of 
administrative decisions (without any decision by a court). Such 
actions were often dramatic; for example, on 2 September 2016 in 
Yalta, 75-year-old entrepreneur Aleksandr Strekalin set himself 
on fire in protest against the demolition of his restaurant, with 
fatal results30. In the absence of registration, and under the pre-
text of the fight against the shadow economy, a number of mar-
kets and bazaars were eliminated, and illegal economic activity is 
now subject to high penalties; for example, renting a private room 
to tourists (which was a source of additional income for Crimean 
Tatars in particular) can now be punished by a fine of up to thirty 
times the amount of income earned31.
Based on media reports and statements from human rights de-
fenders, it can be assumed that in some cases the denial of regis-
tration of a company or the demolition of a property is associated 
with the desire of people associated with the new authorities to 
take over that business. These are often arrivals from Moscow or 
other Russian cities, who have significant financial resources at 
their disposal. Describing this phenomenon in greater detail – as 
well as the problem of property confiscation – would go beyond 
the framework of the current study32.
30 http://ru.krymr.com/a/news/27970104.html; op. cit.
31 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
32 For more on these topics, see the report ‘Annexed Property in Crimea’ 
ed. Yulia Tyshchenko, Kyiv 2016, as well as the programme Все под снос. 
Справедливо ли демонтируют кафе, торговые точки и рынки Крыма 
[Everything under the wrecking ball. Is it fair to demolish the cafes, stores 
and markets of Crimea?], available on the above-mentioned website at http://
ru.krymr.com/a/news/27970104.html
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A problem which affects all Crimea’s inhabitants to a greater or 
lesser degree concerns the medical services, the difficulty of ac-
cess to them and their deteriorating quality. To get to the doctor, 
one needs firstly to get a ticket for the queue for appointments, and 
only then can one arrange a visit. In private clinics there are no 
queues, but certain kinds of tests cannot be carried out, because 
Western reagents have run out, and the Russian replacements are 
of poor quality33. According to media reports, the largest hospitals 
are losing numerous professional staff, especially anaesthesiolo-
gists, who can count on higher earnings (for example, in Central 
Russia) than in Crimea. For example, between April and August 
2016, seven anaesthesiologists left the Municipal Hospital No. 1 in 
Sevastopol alone, a state of affairs which threatens to paralyse the 
surgery department34.
Another effect of the sanctions imposed on Russia is that Crimean 
residents’ access to banking services has become more difficult. 
Crimean ATMs accept credit cards from the Russian Mir system, 
but other transactions often fail to be completed (bankers suggest 
that clients should not use Visa and MasterCard, because there 
have been cases of the machines retaining their cards). Moreo-
ver, remittances from abroad also fail to arrive; the systems reject 
transactions including the word ‘Crimea’ in the name or address 
of the beneficiary, which also affects money transfers for some 
Ukrainian organisations (such as Krym SOS). However, there have 
also been cases where the systems accept money orders if the ad-
dress indicates a town in Crimea without using the name ‘Repub-
lic of Crimea’35.
Problems resulting from ruptured ties with ‘continental’ 
Ukraine include the deterioration of the water supply, power cuts, 
and a complex of issues related to the Crimean Tatar blockade of 
33 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
34 http://classic.newsru.com/russia/26aug2016/sevas.html
35 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
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the peninsula which began in September 2015. In spring 2014, af-
ter the failure of negotiations between the Ukrainian government 
and the de facto authorities of Crimea, Ukraine cut Crimea off 
from the water of the Northern Crimean Canal, which at a stroke 
reduced the irrigated cultivated area in the north of the penin-
sula (from 406,000 hectares before the annexation to a little over 
10,000 hectares in 2015)36 and hence the crop yields, causing the 
need to transition to cultures that demands less water and, where 
possible, spot-watering of plants using water from local sources. 
The deficit of water has not affected those residents of Crimea who 
are employed outside agriculture (apart from the increase in food 
prices): drinking water for the peninsula’s population can be ful-
ly covered by local artesian wells and the water resources of the 
Crimean mountains37.
One serious inconvenience for the economy and residents of Cri-
mea came from the restriction, and then the temporary interrup-
tion of electricity supplies from the Ukrainian ‘mainland’ (before 
the annexation around 70–80% of power consumed on the penin-
sula came from Ukraine). After Russia took control of Crimea, pow-
er supplies took place under an agreement between the Ukrainian 
Ukrinterenerho company and the Russian Inter-RAO energy com-
pany, although between 19 and 22 November 2015 a series of elec-
tricity poles were blown up and long-term damage was caused to 
all four transmission lines (all these attacks took place outside of 
Crimea). No-one confessed to the sabotage, although it should be 
assumed that it was the work of Ukrainian radicals, supporters of 
tough policies against the annexed peninsula, and perhaps having 
36 Как выживает бизнес аграрный в Крыму [How is agricultural business 
surviving in Crimea], Krymskoye Slovo, #2, 26 April 2016. (Crimea’s total land 
area is 2.2 million ha, of which 1.8 million ha is agricultural land, including 
1.6 million hectares of arable land: http://ru.krymr.com/a/27935453.html).
37 Антология современной крымской мифологии..., op. cit. Before the an-
nexation, the peninsula consumed a total of more than 1 bcm of water annu-
ally, 85% of which comes from the Northern Crimean Canal.
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links to radical Crimean Tatar circles38. Moscow has exploited the 
situation for propaganda purposes, on the one hand by accusing 
Kyiv of being ineffective and untrustworthy, and on the other by 
holding a survey in late December 2015 and January 2016 among 
Crimea’s inhabitants as to whether they were in favour of signing 
a new contract with Kyiv to supply electricity if the contract de-
clares that Crimea and Sevastopol are part of Ukraine (a demand 
by the Ukrainian side), and whether they are ready for short-term 
interruptions in the supply of electricity (over a period of three to 
four months). According to VTsIOM, who carried out the survey, 
93.1% of respondents rejected the signing of such a contract, and 
94% declared their readiness to accept the temporary difficulties. 
Although the reliability of these results may raise some doubts, 
they certainly reflect the prevailing mood among most residents 
of Crimea39. After the damage was repaired, Ukraine partially re-
sumed energy supplies to Crimea, but after the expiration of the 
agreement (31 December 2015) no new one was signed.
In May 2016, the fourth and last line of the energy bridge from 
Russia (via the Kerch Strait) was ceremonially opened. On this 
occasion, Moscow announced that Crimea had now become com-
pletely independent of electricity supplies from Ukraine, and that 
the peninsula’s electricity demands were now being met in full. It 
is hard to confirm whether this claim is true. In polls conducted 
earlier as part of the Open Mind project, 22% of respondents stated 
that the power cuts were a fundamental problem, which suggests 
that an energy deficit still exists (although the interruptions may 
also result from the poor state of transmission networks within 
the peninsula; moreover, the network ran in a north-south direc-
tion before the annexation, and now more east-west connections 
38 Rafał Sadowski, Jan Strzelecki, Crimea is left without power, CES (OSW), 25 No-
vember 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/ 2015-11-25/
crimea-left-without-power
39 Глава ВЦИОМа отправил критиков опроса Крыму в «учить жену щи 
варить», https://meduza.io/news/2016/01/02/glava-vtsioma-otpravil-kri-
tikov-oprosa-v-krymu-uchit-zhenu-schi-varit
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are needed). In turn, according to participants in the Crimean Ta-
tar blockade (which will be discussed later in this chapter), the 
relatively good electricity supplies to Crimea at this time derive 
not so much from the energy bridge, as from farms of power gen-
erators powered by oil and gas. The cost of 1 kWh produced in this 
way is alleged to be about 30 roubles (about US$0.46) for which 
residents pay (depending on the tariff) between 1.35 and 5.40 rou-
bles (about US$0.02 to 0.08)40. The participants in the blockade 
treat these figures as evidence of the effectiveness of their actions; 
they were intended to raise the cost of Russia’s support for Crimea, 
and in this way strike at the Kremlin’s finances (it is known that 
the mobile generators were established after the poles and trans-
mission lines on the ‘mainland’ of Ukraine were attacked).
The Crimean Tatar blockade and its consequences
In the initial period after the annexation, no obstacles were 
placed on the import of Ukrainian food and other goods. Ex-
port was facilitated by the introduction (under a Ukrainian 
act of September 2014) to the peninsula of a free economic 
zone (the Russian authorities set up a similar zone in Crimea). 
A large amount of these goods were re-exported on to Russia, 
allowing them to circumvent the embargo Moscow introduced 
in response to the Crimean and Donbas sanctions announced 
by a number of states and international organisations41. This 
situation changed after 20 September 2015, when blockades 
were set up on the access roads to Crimea in order to bring 
a complete halt to all freight transport. The organisers of the 
blockade – which is still in operation – were Crimean Tatar 
activists linked to the Mejlis, who are supported by a num-
ber of Ukrainian organisations (including the Automaidan, 
40 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
41 According to some estimates, up to 200 trucks of food entered Crimea daily 
during that period (20 trucks would have been sufficient). OSW (CES) inter-
views, etc.
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the Maidan Self-Defence and Right Sector). The blockade was 
coordinated by Lenur Islamov, an entrepreneur and political 
activist, who in April and May of 2014 was the Deputy Prime 
Minister of the ‘Republic of Crimea’ on behalf of the Mejlis42. 
The intention of the blockade’s organisers was to express op-
position to the annexation, and to put pressure on the authori-
ties in Kyiv to redouble their efforts to reclaim the peninsula. 
The blockade, which took the form of highway checkpoints (its 
participants resided in camps pitched nearby), contributed to 
the adoption by the Ukrainian government on 16 December 
2015 of legal provisions on the prohibition of supplies to and 
from Crimea of goods and services (with a few exceptions)43. 
Exports from ‘continental’ Ukraine have been reduced, but not 
cut off: for example Ukrainian food is still sold on the penin-
sula, although its prices are higher than in 2014-15, because 
of increased logistic and transport complications (some goods 
are reloaded at the ‘border’ into private passenger cars), which 
generate more costs (due to the necessity of paying bribes, 
among other things)44.
 
42 In the first weeks after the annexation, Mejlis activists were hoping for an 
agreement with Moscow (more on this later in the text). Islamov is a contro-
versial figure in Ukraine, among other reasons because he has not renounced 
his Russian citizenship. In December, 2015 Islamov announced the formation 
of the Asker (warrior) volunteer battalion named after Noman Çelebicihan, 
and began efforts to incorporate it into the Ukrainian army, to which Kyiv 
does not want to agree; the Ukrainian government realises that it would have 
only limited control over the battalion – but they tolerate Islamov’s actions, in 
order not to offend those Crimean Tatar groups which sympathise with him. 
Members of the Asker battalion drive around areas adjacent to Crimea with 
cars numbered ‘Asker 001’, ‘002’, etc. (from the legal point of view, this type 
of registration plate is illegal). This carries the risk of all sorts of provocation, 
which could for example adversely affect Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian relations 
on ‘continental’ Ukraine.
43 http://interfax.com.ua/news/economic/311865.html
44 http://ru.krymr.com/a/news/27792119.html. Lenur Islamov asserts he was 
offered a bribe to lift the blockade amounting to several hundred thousand 
US dollars.
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iV. the empty beaChes of sudaK 
The annexation has significantly affected the tourism sector, 
which has hitherto been the main engine of the peninsula’s 
economy. According to Crimea’s Russian authorities, the number 
of tourists was around 4 million in 2014, and around 4.6 million 
in 201545. This is much lower than in the years preceding the an-
nexation, when an average of 6 million visitors visited Crimea 
annually. In addition, the composition of the visitors’ nationali-
ties and the structure of their arrival have changed: previously, 
about two-thirds of them were Ukrainians, and 70% of all visitors 
(of whom individual tourists made up a large group) arrived by 
train. In 2014-2015, Russians and organised groups had come to 
dominate, arriving mainly by air (44%) and ferry across the Kerch 
Strait (39%). These changes have adversely affected the income of 
small and medium businesses above all (hoteliers, restaurateurs, 
manufacturers and souvenir sellers), as well as people for whom 
the support of tourists was a source of extra income (taxi drivers, 
owners of private accommodation, shopkeepers). Such activities 
were mainly the province of Crimean Tatars, and it is they who 
have lost the most from the departure of individual tourists from 
Ukraine: the participants in organised activities who come from 
greater distances tend as a rule to spend less money, are less likely 
to use the catering facilities, etc. The scale of the phenomenon is 
demonstrated by the fact that although only 5% of the economi-
cally active population of Crimea were working on a permanent 
basis in the tourism industry, casual employment in this sector 
amounted to about 20%, and in the most attractive tourist areas, 
this percentage increased to 37%46. The annexation had least effect 
on the sanatoria, i.e. the post-Soviet health and rest complexes, 
45 http://www.gazeta.ru/lifestyle/news/2014/12/30/n_6792909.shtml; http://
mtur.rk.gov.ru/file/vochnaya_informatsiya_o_kolichestve_turistov__pose-
tivshih_respubliku_krim_za_2015_god.pdf. In addition, due to the ‘Crime-
an’ sanctions, Crimean ports have ceased to receive foreign cruise ships, 
whose passengers are usually very well-off tourists.
46 Антология современной крымской мифологии..., op. cit.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
16
28
which unlike the guest houses, which are usually active only in 
the summer season (numbering around 4500), receive guests 
throughout the year.
Under the conditions described, the fact that tourist traffic has 
decreased by only between a third and a quarter in the years 2014-
2015 should be linked to the intense propaganda campaign con-
ducted by the Russian authorities (who advertise holidays on the 
‘recovered’ peninsula as an act of patriotism), together with pres-
sure on government offices and state-owned enterprises to send 
their employees there on leave (according to independent Russian 
media, specific institutions were even assigned ‘quotas’ of specif-
ic numbers of people to go there; there have also been rumours, 
hard to verify, that false certificates of having been to Crimea 
were being traded). In the first months after the annexation, air-
line tickets to Simferopol were subsidised, which could have also 
encouraged visits by a certain number of individual Russian tour-
ists curious to see the ‘exotic recovered territories.’
According to an announcement by the head of Rosturizm (the Rus-
sian Federal Agency for Tourism), the number of tourists visiting 
Crimea should reach 5.5-6 million for all of 2016, which would be 
close to the state of things before the annexation (in the summer 
season, over 3 million people had already come to relax on the 
peninsula)47. In turn, according to Ukrainian officials responsible 
for tourism, guests will have numbered about one and a half mil-
lion at most. Even though we can see many stories, photos and film 
clips in the Russian and Ukrainian blogosphere and social media 
showing almost empty beaches at the height of the season48, how-
ever, this figure seems to be an underestimate, for two reasons. 
First, the airport in Simferopol and the ferry route have seen 
47 Elena Platonova, Туристы выбирают родное [Tourists go native], 
Gazeta.ru, 13 September 2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/business/ 2016/ 
09/12/10190135.shtml
48 See, for example, the post by the well-known Russian blogger Ilya Varlamov: 
http://varlamov.ru/1818731.html
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a steady increase in the number of passengers (in 2014, 2.8 mil-
lion people passed through the airport, and over 5 million in 2015; 
the ferries transported 4.7 million people in 201549 – although of 
course, not all the travellers are tourists); secondly, tourists from 
Ukraine are slowly returning to Crimea, especially people who 
had previously been in the habit of spending their annual holidays 
there. In 2015, according to official Ukrainian estimates, there 
were about 100,000 such visitors, and this number is expected to 
rise by several times in 201650. The popularity of Crimea as a travel 
destination is demonstrated by the large number of adverts offer-
ing travel and leisure in Crimea, which are a distinctive feature in 
Ukrainian cities, especially around train stations.
Further development of tourism on the peninsula is hindered by 
the following factors:
 – ideological-nationalist motivations. Many people, especially 
Ukrainians, do not want to travel to the ‘occupied areas’ and 
financially support a hostile state;
 – formal and legal obstacles. According to Ukrainian law on 
safeguarding the rights and freedoms of citizens, and the le-
gal system concerning the temporarily occupied territory 
of Ukraine, all citizens of Ukraine may freely enter Crimea 
by land, while foreigners need to get a pass from Ukrainian 
authorities to do so (it is difficult to obtain and formally it is 
not meant for tourist purposes). Technically, foreigners can 
reach Crimea by plane or by ferry from the territory of Rus-
sia, but Ukrainian law treats this as illegal crossing of the bor-
der, hence any such crossing may result in a ban on entry to 
49 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2015/03/09/6450057.shtml; http://www.
gazeta.ru/business/2016/05/26/8265989.shtml; http://www.gazeta.ru/
auto/2016/06/14_a_8307707.shtml
50 http://ru.krymr.com/a/27957594.html
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Ukraine. Inevitably, this limitation does not apply in practice 
to citizens of the Russian Federation;
 – logistical questions. Despite the increase in capacity of the fer-
ry crossing in the port of Kavkaz (in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai, 
on the eastern shore of the Kerch Strait), long queues build 
up regularly (and the crossing does not operate in stormy 
weather), and people travelling in cars must plan for extended 
journey times. Travelling by public transport (except aircraft) 
thus requires three transfers: one must catch a train to Kras-
nodar or Anapa, then a bus to the port of Kavkaz, the ferry 
to Kerch, and once again by bus to one’s final destination (al-
though this is possible on the basis of a single ticket issued by 
Russian railways51);
 – the unfavourable relationship between the price and the quali-
ty of the services, as well as rising prices in Crimea. The price of 
an air ticket to Crimea from many Russian cities is comparable 
to that for flights to Turkey or Thailand (in the cases of Siberia 
or the Far East). Resorts in Turkey (when that market opens up 
again to Russian companies) offer the same prices as in Crimea, 
with more comfortable accommodation and better food.
 
51 http://pass.rzd.ru/static/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=5282
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V. all of us, all our simple nation, we are 
for putin 
Despite the serious economic and social difficulties mentioned 
above, the vast majority of the population of Crimea supports the 
annexation, and they tend to blame problems on the sanctions 
policy of the West or sabotage by Ukraine (the economic blockade 
of the peninsula). This is due to the Crimean people’s tradition-
ally pro-Russian sympathies, the failure to integrate the penin-
sula with Ukraine (especially in cultural terms) between 1954 and 
1991, and especially 1991-2014, as well as Russian propaganda’s de-
pictions of the benefits of Crimea’s integration with Russia.
The population of Crimea before the annexation
In Crimea, ethnic Russians were and still are a consistent 
two-thirds majority of the residents. In practice, outside the 
compact aggregates of Crimean Tatars in rural areas, Crimean 
cities and towns are almost purely Russian. According to the 
Ukrainian census of 2001, Russian was deemed to be the na-
tive language of up to 77% of the population of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea (11.4% of respondents named the Crimean 
Tatar language, and 10.1% Ukrainian). In the separate city of 
Sevastopol, Russian domination was even more pronounced; 
90.6% of the population there declared it as their native lan-
guage, and 6.8% Ukrainian (as a rule the Tatars did not set-
tle in Sevastopol at all). For comparison, in the Donetsk oblast 
these proportions were 74.9% Russian to 24.1% Ukrainian, and 
in Luhansk 68.8% to 30% respectively. In the supposedly heav-
ily Russified Odessa oblast, Ukrainian actually had a slight 
advantage (46.3% to 41.9%)52. In the Autonomous Republic of 
52 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/language/crimea/, 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/language/sevastopol/, 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/language/donetsk/, 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/language/lugansk/, 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/language/odesa/
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Crimea, Russian was an official language next to Ukrainian, 
and its status was guaranteed by appropriate items in the 
Constitution of the ARC (some documents, such as birth cer-
tificates, were completed in both languages).
The Russian domination of Crimea’s cultural sphere is dem-
onstrated by information about the language situation in 
teaching and the media. In 2013, 89.4% of students in Crimean 
schools pursued their studies in Russian, 7.4% in Ukrainian, 
and 3.1% in Crimean Tatar. Of the roughly 600 schools operat-
ing on the peninsula, only 8 had Ukrainian-speaking status, 
and 14 were Crimean Tatar-speaking. Only 5% of academic 
subjects were taught in Ukrainian in Crimea (all the others 
used Russian); only two faculties trained teachers in Crime-
an Tatar language and literature. More than 80% of titles of 
the Crimean press were published in Russian alone, and only 
one newspaper was published in Ukrainian (although a cer-
tain number of titles appeared in two languages). Only 7% of 
programmes produced by Crimean state television were in the 
Crimean Tatar language53.
Among the Russian-speaking population of Crimea, regard-
less of its numerical advantage, there are proportionally many 
more retired Soviet military officers (and retired from the law 
enforcement apparatus) resident there than in other parts of 
the former Soviet Union, who settled on the peninsula after 
retiring from the service54. The views of these individuals, who 
have few ties to Crimea itself, were characterised by typically 
conservative, nationalist and great-power overtones, which 
53 Антология современной крымской мифологии..., op. cit.
54 Many of them retained Russian citizenship or adopted it later. In the elections 
to the Russian State Duma in 2011, 5 stationary and 4 mobile polling stations 
were run in Crimea. Throughout the rest of Ukraine there were 4 stationary 
and 7 mobile polling stations; http://www.edinaya-odessa.org/ksors/37550-
vybory-deputatov-gosdumy-rossii-4-dekabrya-2011-goda-adresa-isbi-
ratelnyh-uchastkov-i-punktov-golosovaniya-na-ukraine.html
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further impeded the integration of Crimea with Ukraine. This 
spirit was apparent even before the Russian annexation – for 
example, in the Museum of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, 
which displayed a range of Russian arms from when the pen-
insula was first joined to Russia to the Chechen wars (soldiers 
of the Fleet participated in them as part of ‘official delegations’, 
as a series of separate noticeboards stated).
According to a study of the ‘Open Mind’ project, 43% of respond-
ents interviewed about their ‘civic identity’ defined themselves as 
‘a resident of Russia’, and 35% as ‘Crimean’. This strong regional 
component can be explained by the sense of distinctiveness which 
formed on the peninsula when it was included into the Ukrain-
ian Soviet Socialist Republic, and in the period from 1991 to 2014 
this sentiment only rose in strength (only 1% of inhabitants iden-
tified as ‘a citizen of Ukraine’). According to studies carried out 
at a similar time in the above-mentioned VTsIOM research, 74% 
of respondents expressed the opinion that the process of integra-
tion with the Russian Federation had in general been successfully 
completed (regardless of the number of issues that still require 
solutions), whereas 25% felt that the majority of matters relating 
to integration had not yet been solved.
This fossilisation of pro-Russian (and pro-Kremlin) sentiment was 
reinforced by the aforementioned departure of groups of Crimean 
Tatars and Ukrainians, and the arrival to work in Crimea of about 
twenty thousand officials and officers of the army & law enforce-
ment agencies – citizens of the Russian Federation (in the short 
term, the appearance of these new residents has generated local 
conflicts, although these mainly relate to the business sphere). 
The peninsula is also now home to several Ukrainian politicians 
linked to the deposed former President Viktor Yanukovych, in-
cluding Pavel Lebedev (the former defence minister) and Vadim 
Kolesnichenko (a former member of the Party of Regions). Viktor 
Yanukovych and former Prime Minister Mykola Azarov also have 
residences in Crimea.
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According to official data, in the first Russian parliamentary 
elections held on the peninsula (18 September 2016), turnout in 
the ‘Republic of Crimea’ reached 49.1%, and 47.0% in Sevastopol 
city (the total figure for Russia was 47.8%), and the ruling United 
Russia party won 72.8% and 53.8% support respectively (54.2% 
throughout Russia). The results would seem to indicate much 
greater support for the ‘party of power’ than elsewhere, but ac-
cording to estimates provided in the independent Russian media, 
United Russia won far fewer votes (even though it won). The aim 
of the electoral fraud would have been to demonstrate consensus 
among the Crimean people, and confirm that the annexation was 
the fulfilment of the will of the people.
Regardless of such possible electoral fraud, the inhabitants of 
Crimea en masse display a high degree of loyalty to the Kremlin; 
one illustration of this attitude may be the statement by Zinaida 
Denisovna, the grandmother of Russian blogger Ilya Varlamov, 
which he posted on the Internet on 31 March 2016 (she is 84 years 
old, and has been living in Crimea in Simferopol since 1957): 
Once again I have begun to be proud of my country, that’s most im-
portant! For 23 years I’ve had no homeland [...] and now I’m in Rus-
sia. […] All of us, all our simple nation, we are for Putin. Putin holds 
the country together, otherwise everything would have fallen apart. 
There wouldn’t be any Russia. We need our country to be great. We 
are proud that we come from the Soviet Union. […] And then what? 
Ukraine, which we don’t even want to mention! For 23 years we were 
living as if we were in a terrible dream. You don’t even understand 
what happiness this is – to feel that you’re living in a great country.55 
Attitudes of this kind are perpetuated by Russian propaganda 
that presents the annexation as an act of historical justice, saving 
55 http://varlamov.ru/1630703.html, the entry titled ‘Важное мнение моей 
бабушки о ситуации в Крыму‘ [My grandmother’s important opinion on 
the situation in Crimea].
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the peninsula from chaos and banditry (which the rest of Ukraine 
is allegedly involved in). This narration has been reinforced by 
statements from leading Russian politicians claiming that the 
only viable alternative to Crimea joining the Russian Federation 
would have been mass bloodshed56.
The domination of Russian media (only internet users and own-
ers of satellite dishes have access to Ukrainian media) is fostering 
the further integration of the peninsula with Russia. Already, the 
degree of this integration in the social and cultural spheres must 
be assessed as higher than the level of integration with Ukraine in 
the years before the Russian annexation. In the Open Mind opin-
ion poll, respondents responded to the question of where they pri-
marily derived their information about events in the country and 
in the world as follows:
 – from Russian television 84%
 – from conversations with relatives, friends and acquaintances, 66%
56 For example, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/01/26/nikolay-patrushev-
mirovoe-soobshhestvo-dolzhno-skazat-nam-spasibo-za-krym.html. Cf. also 
the story from the book ‘Ani żadnej wyspy. Rozmowy o Rosji i Ukrainie’	[Nor 
any island. Talks about Russia and Ukraine] (ed. Piotr Brysacz and Jędrzej 
Morawiecki, 2016, p. 109): I’ll	tell	you	a	story	that	I	heard	from	the	leader	of	the	
Kharkiv	Euromaidan,	a	young	Ukrainian	woman	from	Kerch	in	Crimea.	She	
came	to	Kharkiv	to	study,	then	for	a	time	moved	to	Lviv,	where	she	did	a	doc-
torate	and	learned	to	speak	Ukrainian,	then	she	came	back	to	Kharkiv,	took	
a	job	at	the	University,	and	her	parents,	Russian-speaking	Ukrainians,	still	
lived	in	Kerch.	She	told	me	that	she	calls	her	mother	daily,	simply	because	she	
was	worried	(we	were	speaking	several	days	after	the	annexation	of	Crimea).	
On	the	day	we	met,	she	also	called	her	mother	as	usual	to	ask	what’s	up,	and	
it	slipped	out	that	soon	she	was	going	to	Lviv,	to	which	the	mother	reacted	
hysterically:	‘My	daughter,	but	there	are	Banderites	there,	Nazis,	they’ll	rape	
you	straight	away,	they’ll	kill	you!’.	She	said,	‘Mum,	I	spent	a	few	years	there,	
I	have	friends	there’,	and	her	mother,	more	and	more	scared,	answered,	‘But	
you	don’t	know	what’s	going	on	out	there	right	now!	Every	day	your	father	
and	I	watch	TV	and	we	know!	You	can’t	speak	in	Russian	there,	and	even	if	
you	speak	Ukrainian,	if	you’ve	got	a	foreign	accent,	then...	’.	‘But	mum,	what	
are	you	talking	about?’	she	replied.	‘My	daughter,	you	don’t	know	anything,	
your	father	and	I	can	see	what’s	going	on	there!’.	The	mother	could	never	
be	told	differently.	The	girl	couldn’t	shake	the	impression	that	her	mother	
trusted	the	television	–	of	course,	Russian	TV	-	more	than	her	own	daughter.
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 – from Crimean local TV 47%
 – from pages on the Internet 46%
 – from the Crimean press 35%
 – from social media 34%
 – from Russian radio 29%
 – from local Crimean radio 27%
 – from Russian newspapers 19%
 – from Ukrainian television 16%
 – from Ukrainian radio 2%
The idea that time is working in favour of Russia, and that ties 
with Ukraine will be loosened further, is reinforced by the fact 
that graduates of Crimean schools do not have automatic access 
to universities in Ukraine, because the (Russian) school-leaving 
certificate they receive does not correspond to the Ukrainian 
equivalent. To overcome this, an additional test must be passed, 
which about 70 people decided to do in 2015 (out of more than ten 
thousand graduates). In this situation, which in practice guaran-
tees a place at a Russian university (until 2016 school leavers could 
take advantage of a simplified recruitment system), the vast ma-
jority of graduates will certainly study in Russia, binding Crimea 
even more closely to it57.
57 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
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Vi. the Crimean tatars: for, or eVen 
against it
In the face of the above situation and the prevailing sentiments, 
the most important challenge for the Russian authorities remains 
the matter of the Crimean Tatars. The group most opposed to the 
annexation comes from within this community: according to the 
report ‘The Crimean Tatar ego’ prepared by the Russian newspa-
per Kommersant, about 70% of them boycotted the referendum 
held on 16 March 2014 to join the peninsula to Russia58. This was 
linked to the memory of the mass deportations of their commu-
nity to Central Asia in 1944, and the identification in the people’s 
collective consciousness of the Soviet Union with its successor, 
the Russian Federation. Almost identical data were obtained in 
the Open Mind study: 72% of respondents of Crimean Tatar na-
tionality claimed that they had not voted (overall 24% of Crimean 
respondents said they had abstained). According to the official 
results, turnout in the ARC was 83.1%, and 89.5% in Sevastopol; 
96.8% and 95.6% respectively voted for Crimea and Sevastopol to 
join Russia (according to unofficial information, the turnout in 
the ARC was about 30%, and about 50% of the electorate actually 
voted for the annexation)59.
Initially Moscow wanted to win the favour of the Tatars, offering 
them positions in the government of Crimea, which was accepted 
at an extraordinary session of the Kurultai (a type of parliament 
whose tasks include the selection of the members of the Mejlis). 
When it turned out that the Kurultai and the Mejlis – which had 
58 http://kommersant.ru/projects/crimeantatars. Mejlis activists argue that 
the referendum was boycotted by almost 100% of the Crimean Tatars (OSW 
(CES) interviews, etc.).
59 This data appeared for a while on the webpage of the Presidential Council 
for Civil Society and Human Rights. The case was revealed and publicised by 
Paul Roderick Gregory, a journalist for the US edition of Forbes: http://www.
forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/05/05/putins-human-rights-
council-accidentally-posts-real-crimean-election-results-only-15-voted-for-
annexation/#6cbc9d2310ff.
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not been officially recognised in Ukrainian legislation, although 
informally the authorities had respected the opinion of these 
bodies – would not receive official status in the new situation ei-
ther, and that the Crimean Tatars would not obtain the status and 
rights of indigenous people, the majority of Crimean Tatar activ-
ists and the community as a whole declared that they would not 
cooperate with the Russians. A strongly pro-Ukrainian stance 
was adopted by the Tatars’ leaders, headed by Mustafa Jemilev, 
the longtime leader of the Mejlis (which had previously supported 
the Euromaidan movement)60; they explained their initially am-
biguous reaction to the annexation in terms of concern for the 
survival of the nation.
After unsuccessful attempts to subjugate the Crimean Tatar au-
thorities – only a few people have agreed to collaborate out of the 
33 members of the Mejlis – Moscow decided to create alternative, 
newly-established institutions (this primarily involves the Krym 
movement, headed by Mejlis member Remzi Ilyasov), as well as 
to support activists loyal to it (in this group Emir Ali Ablayev, 
the Crimean mufti and also a member of the Mejlis, enjoys the 
greatest authority). At the same time the repression of the pro-
Ukrainian Crimean Tatar elites began. Several people, including 
Jemilev and Refat Chubarov, the current leader of the Mejlis re-
ceived a five-year ban on entering Russia (including Crimea), and 
several others who left Crimea have had their criminal cases re-
opened, which in practice prevents them from returning to the 
peninsula. In April 2016 the Russian Ministry of Justice added the 
Mejlis to the list of extremist organisations (this step was con-
demned by the Council of Europe), which prevents it from carry-
ing out any activity on the territory of the Russian Federation, and 
gives then an excuse to stop each Tatar who has a Mejlis pendant 
or flag in their car, as such a person can be accused of promoting 
60 See Tadeusz A. Olszański, Crimean Tatars after Russia’s annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula, OSW Commentary, #141, 30 June 2014; https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-07-02/crimean-tatars-after-
russias-annexation-crimean-peninsula
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extremism. The new authorities have also torpedoed any inde-
pendent Crimean Tatar initiatives; for example, they do not allow 
demonstrations to commemorate the deportation of 18 May 1944.
Violations of human rights recorded in Crimea affect the Crime-
an Tatars to the greatest extent. Even though the scale of these 
violations is limited, and do not constitute the persecution of the 
whole nation, they have sometimes been very dramatic. By the 
end of August 2016 18 Tatars were in prison (including three peo-
ple jailed for taking part in the pro-Ukrainian demonstration of 
26 February 2014, i.e. even before the annexation); some of them 
have been accused of participating in extremist organisations, 
including the Islamic Hizb ut-Tahrir Party. About twenty cases 
of disappearances are known (at least one case can be 100% con-
firmed as a kidnapping because the event was recorded by a cam-
era monitoring from a nearby store). Persons involved in the ac-
tivities of the national Mejlis and local mejlisler, which operate in 
towns inhabited by Tatars, are stopped and questioned more com-
monly than others, and their homes are raided (by officers look-
ing for drugs, weapons and forbidden literature), although the 
number of such cases is impossible to estimate61. The Crimean Ta-
tar TV channel ATR was denied renewal of its operating licence. 
As noted by one of the Mejlis activists, “Under Ukraine they used 
to break our laws, but at least we could talk about it, and now we 
don’t even have the possibility of protesting.’62 
Against this background, attention must be paid to such Russian 
legislation as is favourable to the Crimean Tatars; soon after the 
annexation, under a decree by President Putin the community 
was included under the 1991 act on the rehabilitation of ‘repressed 
nations’, and another decree established the Crimean Tatar lan-
guage as one of the three national languages of the ‘Republic of 
61 According to estimates by Mustafa Jemilev, 95% of these raids took place in 
the homes of Tatars. Polowanie na Tatara, op. cit.
62 OSW (CES) interviews, etc.
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Crimea’ (next to Russian and Ukrainian; during the period of the 
Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea this language had no 
special status, although in practice it was used, for example, in 
education). Such legislation, however, is merely formal in char-
acter. The real test of the Russian authorities’ attitude to the is-
sue of the Crimean Tatars will be how they resolve the problem 
of unregulated building work in Crimea. Tatars who returned 
spontaneously to the peninsula since the late 1980s had no op-
portunities to be officially allotted land; they then spontaneously 
occupied empty plots of land and built homes on them, and the 
Ukrainian authorities proved unable to resolve the issue. After 
the Russian annexation it was estimated that illegal buildings oc-
cupy 1451 hectares of land; of the 300 compact Crimean Tatar set-
tlements, 40% do not have running water, electricity or gas, and 
90% lack paved roads63. Legalising the status of at least some of 
these buildings and issuing deeds of ownership would give them 
a sense of stability, which could in turn lead to an increase in pro-
Russian sympathies, especially as the majority of Crimean Tatars 
do not – regardless of the circumstances – intend to leave the pen-
insula, which they consider as their homeland, and who by force 
majeure consent to the current political situation.
 
63 http://kommersant.ru/projects/crimeantatars
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summary
More than two and a half years after the annexation, Crimea re-
sembles more an island than a peninsula, and its limited (in dif-
ferent dimensions) access to the mainland affects its conditions 
and standards of living. The predominant attitude among the in-
habitants of Crimea (the great majority of whom have chosen to 
remain on the peninsula) is to adapt. This attitude is favoured by 
Russia’s policy of ‘facts on the ground’ and its tough rhetoric, rul-
ing out any change in the status quo, as well as Kyiv’s lack of deter-
mination to try and restore control over Crimea. 
If this situation is not changed, within the perspective of a gen-
eration the peninsula will be completely integrated with the rest 
of the Russian Federation (a smaller percentage of the popula-
tion will declare a local Crimean identity for itself). This will be 
boosted by infrastructure projects (especially the bridges across 
the Kerch Strait) and sharing a common media and cultural space 
with Russia, including large-scale departures by graduates of 
Crimean schools to study in Russia. Opinions are regularly ex-
pressed in the Ukrainian media that the population of Crimea re-
grets the annexation and wishes to return to the status quo ante, 
but these should be considered as wishful thinking which has no 
basis in reality. 
The Crimean Tatars, who are a minority on the peninsula, have 
very little chance of real self-determination, even in socio-cul-
tural terms, and in the future the only differentiator of their 
distinctiveness – beyond their cultural Islam and knowing their 
language at an elementary level (about four-fifths of Crimean Ta-
tar children receive their education in Russian) – could be a su-
perficial kind of folklore. This situation will not be changed by 
the quasi-autonomy (the so-called national-cultural autonomy) 
organised in some regions of Russia along the lines of ‘autonomy’ 
of other nations under the aegis of the Russian authorities. This 
name does not correspond to reality, as this is simply a social 
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organisation, a kind of club, and an informal consultative forum 
(this ‘autonomy’ already operates in Crimea itself). 
Although it is difficult to expect that the international community 
will recognised the de iure annexation in the foreseeable future, 
in the perspective of the next few, its de facto recognition is possi-
ble, for example in the gradual easing of the sanctions imposed by 
the West. This will be possible in the case of electoral victories in 
Western countries (France, Austria, the Netherlands) of national-
ist groups seeking to strengthen their cooperation with Moscow.
WojCieCh GóReCki
Work on this text was completed on 5 October 2016
